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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, understanding the determinants of internal conflict has become a
central concern for academics and policy makers alike (see, e.g., Blattman and Miguel,
2010, for a detailed overview). So far, the literature has mostly focused on internal
conflict between organized groups, for example on coups, rebellions, or revolutions.1 Little
attention has been paid, however, to other manifestations of internal conflict, in particular
to riots. Contrary to coups, rebellions, or revolutions—where a potentially persistent
fight occurs between at least two organized groups over the control of the state—riots
are a violent and punctual disturbance to the public order by a crowd of individuals, for
instance with the aim to show disaffection towards government decisions or to oppose
specific government actions; hence they flare up spontaneously and tend to die down
quickly.
This paper looks at the economic causes of rioting. Doing so is important for a variety
of reasons. For one, riots are often associated with a very high number of fatalities.
According to the New York Times (“U.N. Raises Concerns as Global Food Prices Jump”,
September 4, 2010), two days of rioting in Mozambique in August 2010 left ten people
dead and some 300 injured. About two years earlier, a wave of “food riots” in Africa
claimed many more lives (24-100 in Cameroon alone, according to a guess by Berazneva
and Lee, 2013). Looking at our data, which covers Sub-Saharan Africa in the period from
1990 to 2012,2 we observe at least one fatality in about 52% of the cases, with a median of
6 and an average of 66 deaths per event. Overall, in our dataset, there are 1,738 events of
rioting and the associated total number of fatalities is 60,170. Of course, next to the cost
in terms of human lives, rioting is also costly in economic terms. Riots disrupt private
economic activity and basic government functions; as a result, frequent rioting is a severe
1Coups and rebellions are attempts by the armed forces (coup) or by an organized group of civilians
(rebellion) to oust the incumbent government. Revolutions, on the other hand, may also lead to a
fundamental change in political institutions. According to the usual (but not uncontested) definition, a
conflict between organized groups is called a “civil conflict” if it causes at least 25 battle death in a single
year and it is called a “civil war” if this number is greater than 1000 (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
2In our empirical analysis, we use data from 1990–2011 as our main explanatory variable is only
available until 2011.
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obstacle to economic development, particularly in poor places.3
A further reason for focusing on riots is that, according to conventional wisdom, re-
bellions or revolutions rarely start all of a sudden but are often preceded by a series of
protests and riots (see, e.g., Labrousse, 1969, for a detailed account of how the food riots
of 1789, 1830 and 1848 in France turned into bigger conflicts). Thus, a better grasp of the
triggers of riots may lead to a better understanding of the emergence of truly disruptive
events like rebellions or revolutions. Against this background, the present paper offers
two main contributions. First, we develop a simple theoretical framework of rioting. The
framework, which also highlights the difference between riots and other forms of internal
conflicts (like coups, rebellions, or revolutions), makes a clear prediction as to how the
level of rioting in a region is related to the region’s current economic situation. Second,
guided by our theoretical framework, we empirically investigate the relationship between
the level of rioting and current economic circumstances, thereby relying on geographically
and temporally disaggregated data from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Our theoretical framework is a rational rioting model in which rioting is used by
inhabitants of a certain region of a country (the “citizens”) to oppose decisions of a
superior level of government (the “central government”). In particular, we assume that
the central government tries to tax the citizens, while the latter can resort to rioting
to resist taxation. This setup gives rise to a simple Markovian equilibrium in which
we observe high levels of rioting when the current regional output is below the normal
output, while there is little rioting when output is above normal. The intuition is that the
government does not observe the current output level, but only past ones, and hence must
base its taxation decision on expectations. If the regional economy used to operate above
normal in the previous period, expected current incomes are high—which induces the
government to announce high taxes: If incomes are high, rioting comes at a substantial
opportunity cost, thereby muting the citizens’ response to taxation. Yet, if incomes—and
hence opportunity costs—turn out to be lower than expected due to a fall in output,
3For anecdotal evidence, see the Economist article “A cracked nation holds its breath” (January 17,
2008) which describes how the riots that erupted in Kenya in late 2007 imperiled the country’s economy.
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rioting intensifies. In response, the government lowers taxes to calm down the situation.4
Our empirical analysis covers the 1990-2011 period and is based on a geographically
and temporally disaggregated approach. In our case, geographically disaggregated means
that we take as units of observation subnational cells of 0.5×0.5 degrees. Temporally dis-
aggregated, on the other hand, refers to the fact that we focus on monthly observations.
Studying riots, it appears natural to consider short sub-annual periods: Riots flare up
spontaneously and tend to die down quickly (in our sample, 91% do not last longer than
a week).5 Using geo-referenced data from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD),
our prime measure of social unrest in a given cell/month is the number of days with riots.
Since income data is not available at this high level of spatial/temporal resolution, we
follow a reduced-form approach (as do, e.g., Harari and La Ferrara, 2013; Couttenier and
Soubeyran, 2014) to explore how social unrest is affected by current economic conditions.
Our main explanatory variable is the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration In-
dex (SPEI) constructed by Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010). As the name implies, SPEI is a
drought index reflecting the climatic water balance, i.e., the monthly difference between
precipitation and potential evapotranspiration. SPEI is expressed in units of standard
deviations from the long-run average, so that a positive (negative) value in a given month
means an above (below) normal water balance. The water balance matters primarily for
vegetation activity: A lower balance reduces plant growth (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2012)
and hence agricultural output. The SPEI can therefore be taken as an indicator for the
monthly income (above/below normal) generated in a cell.
The raw version of our dataset covers all 0.5× 0.5 degree cells in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, rioting—by definition—requires human presence, and so we do not expect to
observe riots in cells with little population. Our preferred specification thus focuses on
4In 2007-08, falling real incomes (induced by a surge in food prices) caused social unrest to flare up
in 12 Sub-Saharan African countries (see, e.g., Berazneva and Lee, 2013). According to Demeke et al.
(2009), the governments of most of these countries responded by reducing/suspending taxes and tariffs.
5By disaggregating our data to the monthly level, we differ from recent contributions (e.g., Harari and
La Ferrara, 2013; Hodler and Raschky, 2014) which also use geographically disaggregated data to explore
the impact of climate shocks on conflict between organized groups (like rebellions or revolutions). Note,
however, that Harari and La Ferrara (2013) perform a temporally disaggregated analysis in the sense
that they construct climate indicators for weather conditions during the growing season of the year.
4
the sample of cells with a population above the 6th decile (evaluated at the country
level). Our baseline estimates suggest that a one standard deviation decrease in the SPEI
increases the likelihood of rioting by 8.4 percent for the average cell in our restricted
sample. If we restrict our sample to cells with a population above the 9th percentile,
the corresponding number is 33 percent. Alternative specifications suggest, among other
things, that a drop in SPEI has a much larger effect on rioting in cells with a relatively
high share of cropland. This finding supports our conjecture that shocks to the water
balance affect rioting through agricultural incomes.
This paper is related to a vast empirical literature on the impact of economic shocks,
or shocks related to weather anomalies, on violent conflict (Miguel et al., 2004; Burke
et al., 2009; Ciccone, 2011). By using a temporally and geographically disaggregated
empirical strategy, and by relying on a drought index to proxy for weather anomalies, our
work has a particularly close link to recent contributions by Harari and La Ferrara (2013),
Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014), and Hodler and Raschky (2014).6 However, while all
these papers focus on big and potentially sustained conflicts between organized groups,
our focus here is on riots, i.e., on localized events that flare up spontaneously and tend
to die down quickly. Consistent with this pattern, our empirical analysis relies on highly
disaggregated data, both in terms of space (we focus on cells of 0.5 × 0.5 degrees) and
in terms of time (we use monthly observations). Other papers considering riots include
Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) and Aidt and Leon (2014). The former contribution explores
whether deviations from normal rainfall patterns increase the likelihood of various types of
disruptive events (including incidents of organized and armed violence, but also including
spontaneous events like demonstrations, strikes, and riots). Aidt and Leon (2014), on the
other hand, focus on the relationship between rioting and democratic transitions. Both
papers, however, rely on yearly observations at the country level.
By emphasizing that negative economic shocks may spark conflict, our theoretical
framework is related to models of internal warfare or political transitions. For instance,
6A complementary literature explores how enduring structural problems (as distinguished from tran-
sitory shocks) affect the incidence of conflict. Part of this literature also relies on subnational data from
Africa. Examples include Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) who focus on the consequences of ethnic
partitioning; and Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) who explore the role of historical conflicts.
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in the contest models proposed by Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2009; 2010) negative
transitory shocks on agricultural output decrease the immediate cost of fighting—but not
the discounted present value of victory. These models thus predict that groups fight over
political power after a negative income shock. Similarly, in Acemoglu and Robinson’s
(2001) theory of political change, negative shocks may induce democratization because—
in bad times—fighting the autocratic regime is relatively cheap.7 In other dimensions,
however, there are stark differences. Our framework does not seek to explain big events
like civil wars or democratic transitions. We rather explore the occurrence of smaller
events, like riots, which flare up more spontaneously. Therefore, our model does not
rely on competing and organized groups of about the same strength, but rather assumes
that the authorities clash with unorganized crowds of citizens. In the present framework,
the maximum that can be achieved by rioting is to obtain immediate relief through a
temporary fall in taxation; a change in the balance of power is out of reach.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The upcoming section lays out a simple
theoretical model. Section 3 describes our dataset. In Section 4, we present the estimation
framework and the empirical results. Section 5, finally, concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a simple theoretical framework providing an economic explanation
for why riots emerge in equilibrium and for why the level of rioting fluctuates over time.
While we do not test our theoretical framework in a strict sense, it nonetheless motivates
the reduced-form empirical model estimated in Section 4. Our theory predicts riots to
flare up if a government tries to impose onerous taxation, as has been observed throughout
recorded history (see, e.g., Burg, 2004). The framework relies on two key elements. First,
the government does not immediately observe agricultural output in the different regions
of its economy. Second, a high level of rioting impedes the collection of taxes, fees, and
7In Besley and Persson (2008; 2011), it is positive economic shocks (in the form of higher resource rents)
that may lead to conflict because they increase the expected gains from fighting for power. Similarly, in
Oechslin (2010), it is an increase in government-controlled rents that may destabilize the regime.
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bribes. We will argue that these assumptions are natural in the context of Sub-Saharan
Africa, which is the focus of our empirical analysis.
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a region that hosts a set of citizens N = {1, ..., n}. Time t is discrete and
extends to infinity. The citizens derive utility from consumption of a single (non-storable)
agricultural good. Consumption by citizen j ∈ N in period t is denoted by cj,t. Period
utility is assumed to be linear in consumption (and we can think of the intertemporal
utility function as the infinite stream of discounted period utilities).8 In any period,
the region produces a certain amount of an agricultural good (i.e., crop). Agricultural
production is either low or high, Yt ∈ {Y L, Y H}. The two agricultural output levels are
given by Y H = zH Y¯ and Y L = zLY¯ , where Y¯ denotes the normal (or mean) crop level,
zH > 1 > zL, and (zH + zL)/2 = 1. Changes in agricultural output are exogenous. We
assume that Yt = Yt−1 with probability q and Yt = Yt−1 with probability 1− q, where q is
a measure of output persistence. We impose q > 1/2, which implies a positive autocorre-
lation.9 The regional agricultural output is spread equally among the population. Hence,
citizen i’s gross income in t is given by yt = Yt/n.
The region is subject to taxation by a superior level of government, which is henceforth
called the “central government”. Taxation should be understood in a broad sense, i.e.,
to include official taxes and fees, as well as illicit forms of resource diversion. In every
period, the central government announces total regional taxation, Dt, which is equally
spread among the citizens. As a result, citizen i’s announced tax burden in t is given
by dt = Dt/n. When deciding on Dt, the government does not observe the current agri-
cultural output, Yt, but only Yt−1. This assumption appears natural in the context of
Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank (2005), and more recently Jerven (2013), argue
8There is no need to introduce the discount rate formally. As will become clear below, the setup of
the model, as well as our focus on Markovian strategies, imply that the game is essentially static.
9Note that the analysis presented in Subsection 2.2 is completely unchanged if we allow for trend
growth in the normal agricultural output, i.e., if Y¯t = (1 + g)Y¯t−1, where g denotes the growth rate. As
we will show below, what matters for rioting is whether the actual agricultural output is below or above
the normal agricultural output.
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that the lack of unambiguous indicators of economic activity is a key problem in large
parts of the continent. Most central governments thus lack the statistical capacity to
promptly monitor economic performance across the different (and remote) regions.10
The central government’s desired level of taxation, Dt, may not always be imple-
mented. We assume that collecting taxes, fees, or bribes is not feasible if the level of
rioting is high (because, for instance, the accompanying violence is a threat for the tax
collectors). According to Fjeldstad et al. (2014), violent forms of tax resistance have a
long tradition in Sub-Saharan Africa, dating back to colonial times. In our framework,
the government’s ability to enforce Dt depends on two factors, the current level of rioting
in the region and the government’s current strength. The level of rioting (in practice, this





where rj,t refers to citizen j’s participation in riot activities. The strength of the central
government is reflected by the i.i.d. random variable θt which is uniformly distributed
over [0, θˆ(n)], with θˆ(n) increasing in n. By assuming that θt fluctuates, we aim to capture
that the government is sometimes subject to distracting events (such as power struggles at
the national level) that weaken its power in the periphery. To enforce the announced level
of taxation, the government must be sufficiently strong: Taxes are enforced if Rt ≤ θt;
otherwise, if Rt > θt, the level of rioting makes it impossible to collect any taxes in period
t. By conditioning θˆ on the population size n we capture the fact that a riot is more likely
to succeed if a sizeable fraction of population takes part in the riot.11 Furthermore, we
know that the government is more present—and hence stronger—in densely populated
regions than in regions with a low population density12.
10See also Mayshar, Moav, and Neeman (2013) who develop a model which, similar to ours, builds on
the fundamental assumption that the regional output is not perfectly observed by the central authority.
However, while our paper focuses on rioting, Mayshar and coauthors are interested in the consequences
of this informational asymmetry for the emergence and the expansion of the state.
11More people must participate for a riot to be successful in a more densely populated area: everything
else equal, a small number of people rioting in a small village has more impact than in a big city.
12From now on we slightly abuse notation and write θˆ instead of θˆ(n).
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The central government’s goal is to tax the region as much as possible—without,
however, providing any services to the region. As a result, its period objective function is
just given by the current tax revenue (while we can think of the intertemporal objective
function as the infinite stream of discounted future tax revenues). The citizens can help
avoid taxation by participating in riot activities. Participation is an individual choice and
comes at a cost of e(rj,t)yt, where e is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function
(and e(0) = e′(0) = 0). As usual in the literature, the cost depends on yt to reflect that
conflict participation is more costly in periods of strong economic activity (because, e.g.,
more yield is forgone by the time spent on rioting).
We focus on the (pure strategy) Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), where strategies
depend only on the payoff-relevant variables. These consist for the central government of
the past agricultural output, Yt−1 (since it does not observe the current crop level); and
for the citizens of the current agricultural output and the announced level of taxation, Yt
and Dt. The timing of events is as follows. First, Yt−1 becomes common knowledge and
Yt is privately observed by the citizens. Second, the central government announces the
level of taxation, Dt. Third, the citizens simultaneously decide on their participation in
riot activities, rj,t, which determines the overall level of rioting, Rt. Fourth, the current
strength of the central government, θt, becomes common knowledge. If Rt ≤ θt, the
announced level of taxation, Dt, is implemented; otherwise, the region escapes taxation.
2.2 Analysis
To obtain explicit solutions, we make specific functional-form assumptions regarding the
individual cost associated with participation in riot activities.13 In particular, we assume
that e rises with the square of rj,t (i.e., e(rj,t) = (rj,t)
2).
To solve the model, we go backwards through an arbitrary period t. Recall that a citi-
zen’s strategy can only depend on the two payoff-relevant variables Yt and Dt. Remember
further that Yt will be disclosed to the central government at the beginning of period
13Given the assumptions made in Subsection 2.1, what is required for the results derived below to hold
(in qualitative terms) is that the cost function e is “sufficiently” convex.
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t+1. As a result, the citizens’ decisions on rj,t do not alter the government’s information
set when deciding on Dt+1—and hence do not have any implications for subsequent de-
cisions. The maximization of the intertemporal utility function is therefore achieved by
maximizing expected current consumption in every single period. The latter is given by
E{cj,t|Yt, Dt} = (yt − dt)
(
1− F (rj,t +RN\j,t)
)
+ ytF (rj,t +RN\j,t)− e(rj,t)yt, (2)
where RN\j,t =
∑
N\j rj,t. Taking into account the functional-form assumptions introduced
above, the maximization of E{cj,t|Yt, Dt} with respect to rj,t yields r∗j,t = dt/(2θˆyt).14 As










So we observe higher levels of rioting if the government announces a higher level of taxation
(because then participation in riot activities has a higher expected payoff); or if total
agricultural output is lower (because then the individual cost of participation is lower).
Regarding taxation, note that the maximization of the government’s intertemporal
objective function is—again—achieved through period-by-period maximization. When
deciding on current taxes, the government takes the citizens’ response, given by (3), into
account. So the government’s strategy would ideally depend on the current level of the
agricultural output. However, the government does not observe Yt, and so its decision is
based on the conditional expectation of Yt. Formally, the government chooses Dt so as to
maximize E {Dt (1− F (R∗t )|Yt−1} . The solution to this problem is given by
D∗t = D
∗(Yt−1) =
 ((θˆ)2/n)Y LY H(qY L + (1− q)Y H)−1 : Yt−1 = Y H((θˆ)2/n)Y LY H(qY H + (1− q)Y L)−1 : Yt−1 = Y L . (4)
Since q > 1/2, it follows that D∗(Y H) > D∗(Y L): If the previous agricultural output was
14This result requires dt/yt ≤ 2(θˆ)2/n. If this condition were violated, we would have r∗j,t = θˆ/n,
implying that the government would fail with certainty to enforce the announced level of taxation. The
results derived below suggest that this condition always holds if YH/2 ≤ qYL + (1 − q)YH , which is
henceforth assumed (just to avoid a distinction of cases that would not add any additional insights).
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above the normal level, the central government’s expectation of the current agricultural
output—and hence the expected cost of riot activities—is also relatively high. As a result,
the citizens’ incentives to participate in riot activities are expected to be weak—which
induces the central government to announce a relatively high level of taxation.
We now combine the best responses of the citizens (equation 3) and the central gov-
ernment (equation 4) and arrive immediately at the following results:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium level of rioting depends on the deviations of the past and
the current agricultural output from the normal one. Using zt = Yt/Y¯ , we obtain:
R∗t = R
∗(zt−1, zt).
There are four different levels of rioting, which can be ordered as follows:15
R∗(zL, zH) < R∗(zH , zH) < R∗(zL, zL) < R∗(zH , zL).
The ranking in Proposition 1 implies that rioting is at its highest level if Y L is preceded
by Y H . Why? As discussed following equation (4), the observation of an above-normal
agricultural output level in t− 1 makes the central government announce relatively high
taxes in t. So, if the current crop level turns out to be below-normal, instead of above-
normal as expected, the government tries to impose heavy taxation in a situation where
participation in riot activities is cheap. The result of this must be a high level of riot-
ing. On the other hand, rioting is at its lowest level if Y H is preceded by Y L. In this
constellation, the government’s current taxation plans are just modest, while the cost of
participating in riot activities is high. Finally, if there is no change in agricultural output,
the level of rioting is intermediate as the announcement of relatively high (low) taxes
coincides with a relatively high (low) cost of participation.16 In sum, it is the fact that
15The four levels of rioting are given by R∗(zH , zt) = (θˆ/2)(zLzH/zt)(qzL + (1 − q)zH)−1 and
R∗(zL, zt) = (θˆ/2)(zLzH/zt)(qzH + (1− q)zL)−1, where zt ∈ {zL, zH}.
16We have R∗(YH , YH) < R∗(YL, YL) because, if Yt−1 = YL, there is a chance that the output increases
between t − 1 and t, which makes the government announce relatively high taxes (as compared to a
situation in which Yt = YL is certain). Hence the relatively high level of rioting if Yt−1 = Yt = YL.
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the central government sometimes misjudges the region’s economic situation that leads
to fluctuations in rioting.
2.3 From Theory to Evidence
Proposition 1 suggest a simple contemporaneous relationship between the level of rioting
and the deviation of the actual agricultural output from its normal level:
Conjecture 1 Other things equal, as illustrated by Figure 1, we should observe that the
regional level of rioting (e.g., the number of days with riots over a certain period) is:
• Relatively high if the actual agricultural output is less than the normal output;
• Relatively low if the actual agricultural output is greater than the normal output.
The relationship is less strong in less densely populated regions.17
Section 4 explores whether such a negative and immediate impact of agricultural
output deviations can be identified in Sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, we use monthly data
and interpret subnational cells of 0.5 × 0.5 degrees as regions. Motivated by Conjecture
1, our baseline regression equation relates the level of rioting in a given cell and month
to a measure of the monthly deviation of the actual from the normal cell output. This
disaggregated approach is tailored to the frequent and localized nature of the phenomenon.
Unlike conflicts between organized groups, which are usually measured as binary responses
at higher levels of geographical and temporal aggregation, riots flare up immediately in
response to a stimulus (e.g., onerous taxation), are short-lived, occur multiple times in a
year, and are usually confined to the region affected by the stimulus.
Figure 1 here
17The slope of the line in Figure 1 is given by −2θˆ(n)q(1− q)(1− (zH − 1)2(2q − 1))−1, implying that
the relationship is more pronounced when θˆ(n) and zH take higher values; and when q is closer to 1/2.
12
To uncover any possible causal effect of agricultural output fluctuations on the level of
rioting, we need to address a number of issues. Most importantly, there are a two econo-
metric problems that make it difficult to identify causal effects in our context. First, cell
output could be endogenous in the sense that—although not modeled in the theoretical
framework—there may be forces affecting crop level and rioting simultaneously. Such
forces may be time-varying and related to regional developments (e.g., an inadequate
response by the central government to a regional natural disaster) or to national devel-
opments (e.g., an unpopular change in national economic policies that is costly to the
region). Moreover, we cannot rule out that there are time-invariant cell characteristics
(e.g., the terrain) that affect both output and unrest. Second, there could be problems of
reverse causality as the level of rioting may have an impact on economic activity. If the
empirical measure of cell output reflects output net of rioting costs, (1 − e(Rt/n))Yt, an
exogenous surge in the level of rioting (e.g., due to a spike in ethnic tensions) reduces mea-
sured cell output. Finally, there is an issue of data availability. Following a geographically
and temporally disaggregated approach, the required output data is not available.
We deal with all of these issues by means of our set of explanatory variables. We
control for any time-invariant cell-characteristics by using cell fixed-effects. We further
include region-by-month and country-by-year fixed-effects to account for time-varying
confounding factors as much as possible (including any seasonal patterns). To proxy for
deviations of the actual agricultural output from the normal output, we use the Stan-
dardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) constructed by Vicente-Serrano
et al. (2010). Section 3 below argues in detail why the SPEI is a well-suited proxy in our
context. In brief, SPEI is a drought index that reflects a cell’s climatic water balance.
An index value greater (less) than zero indicates an above-normal (below-normal) water
balance. As a result, there is a positive association between SPEI and the deviation of
agricultural productivity—and hence agricultural output—from its normal level. So, in
line with much of the related conflict literature (e.g., Burke et al., 2009; Harari and La
Ferrara, 2013; Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014), we perform a reduced-form analysis. Re-
lying on SPEI is also a way of addressing any omitted variables and the reverse-causality
13
problem: Apart from the time-invariant factors such as latitude, SPEI is constructed from
weather information only—and is therefore strictly exogenous. That is, random fluctua-
tions in weather are independent of any other potentially confounding factor. Moreover,
the level of rioting has no impact on weather and therefore reverse causality is not an
issue when using SPEI. Finally, to explore whether a possible effect of SPEI on riot-
ing works through the agricultural output channel, we estimate additional specifications
which interact SPEI with a measure of the share of the cropland in the cell.
To sum up, our baseline regression equation to be estimated in Section 4 is given by
R∗it = α + βSPEIit + γi + δrm + ρcy + εit, (5)
with i and t standing for cell and month, respectively. As in the theoretical framework,
R∗it is a measure of the level of rioting. γi refers to cell (i) fixed effects, while δrm and
ρcy denote, respectively, the region-by-month (r and m) and the country-by-year (c and
y) fixed effects (with the regions being Eastern, Western, Southern, and Middle Africa).
The parameter of interest in specification (5) is β, which is predicted to have a negative
sign by Conjecture 1. Conjecture 1 also predicts that this relation should be stronger
in more populated area. Assuming that the impact of SPEI works through the output
channel, we further expect the SPEI-cropland share interaction (not shown in 5) to enter
negatively. Given the structure and the size of the dataset (long panel with more than
2,000,000 observations), we employ linear panel estimation throughout. That is, we follow
the recent conflict literature (e.g., Harrari and La Ferrara, 2013; Hodler and Raschke 2014)
in relying on linear estimation even when we rely on binary dependent variables.
3 Data
3.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis relies on several data sources. The information used to construct
our dependent variable stems from the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD). SCAD
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lists different types of social unrest (like strikes, demonstrations, or riots) starting from
1990 for all African countries with a population size of more than one million. The
database was compiled by Hendrix and Salehyan and is based on newswires from Asso-
ciated Press and Agence France Presse.18 The data are geo-coded and contain detailed
information on, among other things, event type and duration. SCAD does not include,
however, violent events that are directly related to armed internal conflicts. Such events
are covered by the PRIO/Uppsala ACLED dataset, i.e., by the data source that is typ-
ically used in the related conflict literature. The type of unrest events we consider here
are riots. Broadly consistent with the role of rioting in our theoretical framework, a riot
is defined by SCAD as a “distinct, continuous, and violent action” directed toward gov-
ernment authorities (or toward members of a distinct “other” group). We construct three
different dependent variables at the cell-month level. The first two variables, NoD and
Inc, are measures of the level of rioting. NoD is a count variable that gives the number
of days with riots; it is the measure that most closely mirrors its theoretical counterpart,
R∗it. Inc reflects riot incidence; it is a binary variable that equals one if we observe at least
one riot. The third dependent variable, Ons, reflects riot onset; it is a binary variable
that equals one if we observe at least on riot in t, but none in t − 1. The two binary
dependent variables are often used in the related conflict literature.
The main explanatory variable is an agriculture-relevant drought index, the so-called
Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) which was developed by
Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010). SPEI reflects the climatic water balance at different time
scales. We consider the monthly climatic water balance, i.e., the monthly difference be-
tween precipitation and potential evapotranspiration. The climatic water balance is an
important factor affecting vegetation activity and, as a result, agricultural productivity.
According to Vicente-Serrano et al. (2012), the correlation between the water balance
and vegetation activity is particularly strong and immediate under arid, semi-arid, and
sub-humid conditions, i.e., under conditions one finds in many parts of Africa’s agricul-
tural regions. Moreover, in many African countries, production at the farm level is highly
18The database can be accessed through the website www.sca ddata.org. See the codebook, which is
posted on the website, for a full description of the database.
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diversified in terms of crops (see, e.g., Chavas and Di Falco, 2012). The growing and
harvest season therefore tends to cover a large part of the year, implying that moisture
conditions matter throughout the year as well. Importantly, SPEI is a standardized vari-
able. It expresses the climatic water balance in units of standard deviations from the
long-run average (which is calculated over the 1901-2012 period). A value of zero means
that the water balance is exactly at its long-run average; a value of plus one (minus
one) means that the water balance is one standard deviation above (below) the long-run
average, etc. This standardization, and the fact that the water balance matters for agri-
cultural productivity throughout the year, make the index particularly well suited for the
present context: Deviations of SPEI from zero can be interpreted as deviations of the
actual agricultural output from the normal agricultural output; moreover, given that the
agricultural sector has a significant weight in Sub-Saharan economies, SPEI can also be
regarded as a proxy for deviations of the actual total output from its normal level.19
By using a drought index, instead of just rainfall and/or temperature, we follow some
of the more recent papers on climate and conflict (e.g., Harari and La Ferrara, 2013;
Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014). One of the concerns with rainfall as such is that it is
not a priori clear how and to what extent precipitation affects agriculture. For instance,
the impact of precipitation on agriculture depends also on the degree to which water is
retained by the soil. The capacity of the soil to retain water, in turn, depends on a variety
of factors, including most notably surface temperature, but also air humidity, sunshine
exposure, latitude, and wind speed. Drought indices like SPEI or PDSI (which is used
by Couttenier and Soubeyran, 2014) incorporate this information. We chose to use SPEI
because of its higher level of disaggregation. Given that we consider riots (which are more
frequent and more localized than conflicts between organized groups), the high level of
spatial and temporal disaggregation is an important part of our empirical strategy.
Next to relying on SCAD and the SPEI database, we work with a variety of other
19In the average Sub-Saharan economy, agricultural output accounted for about one third of the GDP
in 1990 and for about one fourth in 2010, according to data from the World Development Indicators
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). For the year 1990, FAO data
(http://faostat.fao.org) classifies about 65% of the total population in Sub-Saharan Africa as agricultural
population (for the year 2010, the corresponding number is 55%).
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information sources. We use data on population sizes from the PRIO-GRID project
(Tollefsen et al., 2012). We need population data because—following the prediction of
Conjecture 1—we restrict our empirical analysis to areas with a certain population den-
sity (see the following subsection). We also use data on the share of crop areas in each
cell (Ramankutty et al., 2008) to explore whether the impact of the SPEI on riots works
through deviations of the actual agricultural output from the normal one, as described
in Subsection 2.3. Finally, we use the relevant United Nations Statistics Division classi-
fication to assign each 0.5 × 0.5 degree cell to a Sub-Saharan region, which allows us to
construct the region-by-month fixed effects. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the
main variables used in the later empirical analysis.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
NoD 0.002046 0.15998 0 31 2006120
Inc 0.000753 0.027434 0 1 2006120
Ons 0.000655 0.025594 0 1 2006120
SPEI -0.163 0.996 -8.506 6.68 1910722
Pop 76696.532 190084.118 0 5399045.5 2001571
Crop 0.083 0.138 0 1 1977080
Note: Summary Statistics for the full sample. NoD: number of days with riots; Inc: binary indicator that equals one if at
least one riot is observed; Ons: binary indicator that equals one if at least on riot is observed in t, but none in t - 1; SPEI:
Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index; Pop: population size; Crop: share of land used for growing crops or
pasture; GDPpc: GDP per capita.
3.2 Geographical Characteristics of Rioting
Conjecture 1 predicts that the relation between agricultural output and rioting should
be stronger in more densely populated area. Many regions in Sub-Saharan Africa are
characterized by types of land that are hostile to human settlement (e.g., deserts, regularly
flooded areas, or dense forests). These regions typically show a low populations density.
Thus, for our analysis, we group cells according to the population distribution for each
country and focus on cells in which the population is greater than the population at
a specific decile of the relevant country’s distribution. Table 2 shows some descriptive
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics based on population deciles
Decile N (cells) Rioting SPEI Cropland Population
1 6,810 .971542 -.15655722 .08757274 11221
2 6,062 .9569821 -.1516641 .09185871 16194
3 5,294 .943084 -.1424928 .09699274 21706
4 4,549 .9285241 -.13848273 .10282339 28095
5 3,802 .8762409 -.13378653 .1098709 37054
6 3,034 .8232958 -.12856168 .11767683 51319
7 2,278 .7372601 -.12379031 .12722936 72006
8 1,518 .6512243 -.1154652 .1386438 105547
9 756 .5201853 -.10765097 .15088922 172342
Note: The different rows show summary statistics for various variables when restricting the sample to cells with a population
greater than the population at certain deciles (listed in Column 1) of the relevant country’s distribution. Column 2 indicates
the number of observations that are left when focusing on cells with a population above a specific decile. Column 3 shows
the share of observations with at least one riot that are covered by the restricted sample. Column 4 indicates the average
SPEI for the restricted sample. Column 5 contains the average percentage of cropland in the restricted sample and Column
6 shows the average population sizes of the cells that are at the respective decile.
statistics for cells which are, respectively, above the 1st, the 2nd, · · ·, and the 9th decile.
Column 2 of the table shows that more than 82 percent of all observations with at
least one riot are covered by cells with a population greater than the population at the
6th decile of the relevant country’s distribution. When we take the 9th decile as the
threshold, the corresponding number is still 52 percent. It can also been seen that the
average share of cropland increases with the size of the population. While only an average
of around 9 percent of the overall cell area is cropland when we exclude cells in the 1st
decile, more than 15 percent on average is used for growing crops when we focus on cells
above 9th decile. Evidently, being restrictive in terms of population size comes at the
cost of loosing a substantial share of cells and—to a lesser extent—also of loosing riots.
In the following empirical analysis, we therefore focus on cells with a population greater
than the population at the 6th decile of the relevant country’s distribution. In doing so,
we still cover more than 82 percent of all observations with at least one riot. Imposing
this restriction implies that the share of observations with at least one riot rises from 0.08
to 0.16 percent, while the share of cells with at least one riot (over the entire period) rises
from 6.7 to 12.3 percent. At the same time, the average share of land used for growing
crops increases from less than 9 percent to about 12 percent.
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4 Results
Table 3 shows the results for the baseline specification when we restrict our sample to
cells with a population above the 6th decile (evaluated at the country level, as described
in Section 3).20 The differences in the estimates between the alternative specifications
(Columns 1–3, 4–6, and 7–9) stem from the use of different sets of fixed effects as indicated
by the lower half of Table 3. As described in Subsection 2.3, γi, δrm, and ρcy stand for
cell, region-by-month, and country-by-year fixed effects, respectively (see also the notes
at the bottom of the table). Table 7 in the Appendix displays results based on alternative
population restrictions. We discuss them briefly at the end of this section.
The signs of the parameter estimates for SPEI are negative throughout, as predicted.
In particular, consistent with the theory, there is a significant negative relationship be-
tween SPEI and the level of rioting: When we use Inc, the binary measure, as a proxy for
the level of rioting, the relationship is highly significant; when we rely on NoD, the count
measure, the relationship is at least marginally significant (note that the vast majority of
rioting incidences in our dataset—85%—only last for a week or less). We further observe
that a drop in SPEI has a highly significant impact on the onset of riots. In terms of
magnitude, the estimates in Table 3 suggest that a one-standard-deviation decrease in
SPEI increases the probability of observing a riot in a given cell and month by 8.4 per-
cent for the average cell in our restricted sample.21 Similarly, a one-standard-deviation
decrease in SPEI translates in an increase in the number of days with riots in a given cell
and month of 10.3 percent. This implies a rather substantial effect when calculated at
the yearly level—assuming that the change in the SPEI would be constant throughout
the year and for all cells.
One obvious extension of the baseline specifications is the analysis of potential inter-
20However, as a robustness check we also estimated an identical specification when evaluating the 6th
decile for the entire Sub-Saharan Africa. The results are very similar and are available from the authors
upon request.
21A one standard deviation below the mean in the SPEI increases the likelihood to observe a riot in
a cell in a month by 0.0126 percentage points. The unconditional probability of having a riot in a cell
(with population above the 6th decile) in a month is 0.0015. A drop of one standard deviation in the
SPEI thus increases the likelihood of having a riot on the average cell by around 8.4%.
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Table 3: Baseline specifications
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
SPEI -0.000384 -0.000126 -0.000130 -0.000379 -0.000124 -0.000129 -0.000440 -0.000128 -0.000130
(0.108) (0.011) (0.004) (0.110) (0.013) (0.004) (0.053) (0.008) (0.004)
N 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285
NoG 2977 2977 2977 2977 2977 2977 2977 2977 2977
Tmin 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Tmean 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1 263.1
Tmax 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264
γi Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
δrm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρcy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
δm Yes Yes Yes
ρy Yes Yes Yes
Note: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the cell level. NoD: number of days with riots; Inc: binary
indicator that equals one if at least one riot is observed; Ons: binary indicator that equals one if at least on riot is observed
in t, but none in t - 1; N: number of observations; NoG: number of cells; Tmin, Tmean, and Tmax: minimum, mean, and
maximum number of months available for all cells in the sample. γi: cell fixed effects; δrm: region-by-month fixed effects;
ρcy : country-by-year fixed effects; δm: month fixed effects; ρy : year fixed effects.
actions effects. In particular, we suspect the impact of SPEI on rioting to be stronger in
areas with a higher agricultural activity (because of a stronger link between SPEI and
total cell output in agricultural areas). Table 4 presents several specifications testing for
the presence of such effects. Columns 1–3 show results when an interaction SPEI×Crop
is included, where Crop is a dummy that equals one if the share of cropland is above the
median; in Columns 4–6, the interaction term is SPEI×Pop8, where Pop8 is a dummy
that equals one if the population is above the 8th decile (note that the sample is restricted
to only include cells with a population above the 6th decile). Finally, columns 7–9 account
for the two interactions simultaneously. The reason for including columns 4–6 and 7–9 is
the positive correlation between population size and the share of crop area as shown in
Table 2. Hence, columns 4–6 confirm that there is a larger effect in more densely pop-
ulated areas even when using the restricted sample (see also Table 7 in the appendix).
Columns 7–9 confirm that the interaction effect for SPEI×Crop remains economically
and statistically significant even when accounting for an interaction effect between SPEI
and Pop8. That is, the interaction effect between SPEI and the share of cropland is not
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Table 4: Interaction effects
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
SPEI -0.00017 -0.000027 -0.000032 -0.000241 -0.000032 -0.000039 -0.000073 0.000042 0.000034
(0.554) (0.447) (0.359) (0.398) (0.437) (0.337) (0.832) (0.367) (0.446)
×Crop -0.000311 -0.000146 -0.000144 -0.000271 -0.000119 -0.000118
(0.431) (0.054) (0.042) (0.481) (0.090) (0.078)
×Pop8 -0.000292 -0.000194 -0.000186 -0.000257 -0.000178 -0.000171
(0.530) (0.043) (0.038) (0.577) (0.054) (0.052)
N 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285
Note: p-values in parentheses. All specifications include cell (γi), region-by-month (δrm), and country-by-year (ρcy) fixed
effects. Crop and Pop8: are dummies variables for cells with, respectively, an above-median share of cropland and a
population above the 8 decile. See Table 3 for additional information.
spurious in the sense that the estimates for SPEI×Crop only reflect the effects of a larger
population in agricultural areas.
Focusing on the results for riot incidence (Ins) and onset (Ons), both interaction terms
(SPEI×Crop and SPEI×Pop8) are statistically significant. The estimates for the level
of SPEI become insignificant and much smaller. More specifically, we see a 16 percent
increase in the estimates when introducing the SPEI-cropland interaction (columns 1–3)22
and 54 percent increase when introducing the SPEI-population interaction (columns 4–
6).23 The estimates for both interaction terms decrease slightly in terms of size but they
remain statistically significant in the joint specification (columns 7–9). The empirical
findings shown in Table 4 hence confirm that—consistent with our initial conjectures—a
drop in SPEI has a larger effect on rioting in areas whith a higher agricultural activity.
Table 5 in the Appendix shows results when we control for the potential persistence of
the dependent variable and for lagged effects of SPEI.24 According to Columns 1–3 and
7–9, the inclusion of various lags of the dependent variable does not change the estimated
22This pattern remains when we investigate the interaction further. E.g., using 4 interaction terms
instead of one, i.e. dividing Crop into 4 categories (-25th, 25th-50th, 75th+ percentile), we find negative
and significant effects for both categories above the median and no significant effect below the median.
23Table 7 in the appendix provides a more detailed analysis for different sample restrictions. The results
in Table 7 are very much in line with columns 4–6 in the sense that there is a monotonic relationship
between population size and the effect of SPEI on rioting. In particular, the effect of SPEI on rioting is
strictly increasing with population size.
24Given the long time dimension of our dataset (263 month on average) we employ standard fixed-effects
regression as the Nickell (1981) bias is negligible in our case.
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impact of SPEI by much (in absolute terms, the point estimates turn slightly bigger).
However, a difference worth noticing concerns the statistical significance of the estimates
relying on NoD, our count measure, as the dependent variable. While the estimated
impact of SPEI on NoD is only marginally significant in Table 3, it is highly significant
when we introduce lagged values of NoD. Similarly, the inclusion of lagged values of SPEI
does not affect substantially the estimated contemporaneous impact of SPEI on rioting
(Columns 4-6). As for the lagged effects of SPEI, no clear picture emerges.
Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix display the results of several robustness checks, in-
cluding first-differencing and changing the sample restriction. The results based on the
standard first-differenced (fd) specification, shown in Columns 1–3 of Table 6, bring again
a confirmation of the baseline results. The fd-estimates are just slightly more significant,
both in economic and statistical terms. Moreover, when we relate the level of rioting, or
riot onset, to changes in SPEI (i.e., SPEIt−SPEIt−1), we also tend to find a significant
negative relationship (see Columns 4–6 of Table 6). Consistently with Conjecture 1, we
can see in Table 7 that, overall, being more restrictive in terms of population leads to
higher parameter estimates (in absolute terms), indicating a stronger effect of SPEI. For
instance, when we include all cells above the 5th decile, a one-standard-deviation decrease
in SPEI rises the likelihood of observing at least one riot by 7 percent in the average cell;
when only cells above the 9th decile are included, the corresponding number is 33 percent.
Finally, Table 8 in the Appendix reports results for different types of standard errors.
So far, all standard errors have been clustered at the cell level. However, given the
precision of our data in terms of both space and time (with an average of 263 month in our
sample), different forms of spatial dependence and autocorrelation may affect standard
errors. Columns 1–3 of Table 8 therefore report results based on standard errors that
are robust to spatial and temporal dependence (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). Columns 4–
6 display results for classical heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
standard errors (Newey and West, 1994), while the estimates in Columns 7–9 are based
on standard errors that are robust to arbitrary intra-group autocorrelation (Kiefer, 1980).
As can be seen from the table, our baseline results are highly robust to changes in the
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type of standard errors used.
5 Conclusions
Anecdotal evidence suggests that violent riots, which are a widespread phenomenon in
poorer economies, disrupt commerce and basic government functions. Frequent outbursts
of riots are therefore a serious obstacle to economic growth in developing countries. Our
data from Sub-Saharan Africa suggest further that riots are also costly in terms of human
lives. Over the 1990–2012 period, the average riot was associated with 66 fatalities. Al-
though riots matter, the internal-conflict literature has so far almost exclusively focused
on explaining conflict between organized groups, such as coups, rebellions, or revolutions.
This paper, by contrast, explores some possible triggers of riots. Our theoretical frame-
work predicts a negative relationship between the level of rioting and the deviation of
the actual output from its normal one: Riots flare up in response to a deterioration of
a region’s economic situation because the central government is slow in lowering the tax
burden; put differently, in the framework, riots are triggered by onerous taxation. Our
empirical analysis, which relies on highly disaggregated data (monthly, 0.5 × 0.5-degree
cells), indeed suggests that the level or rioting is high (low) if the actual output is be-
low (above) the normal one. As monthly output data at such a high spatial resolution
is unavailable, we use the SPEI drought index—which can be viewed as an indicator of
agricultural productivity—to proxy for deviations of the total output from normal levels.
We find that a one-standard-deviation decrease in SPEI rises the likelihood of a riot in a
given cell and month by 8.4 percent. We further find larger effects in cells with an above-
median share of cropland. This finding substantiates the conjecture that SPEI affects the
level of rioting through the (agricultural) output channel.
By exploring the triggers of violent riots, the present paper gives also rise to a number
of new questions that will be interesting to address. For instance, anecdotal evidence
suggests that “big” events like rebellions or revolutions are often preceded by periods
with high levels of rioting (while, of course, not all periods with high levels of rioting
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are followed by rebellions or revolutions). So an obvious question would be whether we
find such correlations in the data. Similarly, it would be important to have a model that
would allow us to explore the circumstances under which a series of riotst is more likely
to escalate into a full-blown rebellion or revolution. Addressing these questions would
help to fill the void between research on rioting and the literature on conflict between
organized groups. At the moment, we leave these questions to future research.
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Appendix
Table 5: Estimation results including lags of the dependent variables and SPEI
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
DV,
lag 1 0.411 0.0790 -0.0355 0.418 0.0830 -0.0356
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lag 2 0.0166 0.0226 0.0226
(0.630) (0.005) (0.005)
lag 3 -0.00480 0.0207 0.0207
(0.797) (0.003) (0.003)
SPEI, -0.000510 -0.000142 -0.000139 -0.000405 -0.000145 -0.000147 -0.000488 -0.000130 -0.000131
(0.018) (0.006) (0.003) (0.088) (0.005) (0.002) (0.024) (0.010) (0.004)
lag 1 -0.000071 0.000088 0.000091
(0.739) (0.079) (0.057)
lag 2 -0.000347 -0.000107 -0.000081
(0.217) (0.009) (0.047)
lag 3 -0.000456 -0.000028 -0.000023
(0.033) (0.496) (0.568)
N 774241 774241 774241 771215 771215 771215 780270 780270 780270
Note: p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the cell level. NoD: number of days with riots; Inc:
binary indicator that equals one if at least one riot is observed; Ons: binary indicator that equals one if at least on riot is
observed in t, but none in t - 1; N: number of observations; All specifications include cell (γi), region-by-month (δrm), and
country-by-year (ρcy) fixed effects.
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Table 6: Estimation results for first-differenced specifications
NoD, fd Inc, fd Ons, fd NoD Inc Ons
SPEI, fd -0.000471 -0.000191 -0.000189 -0.000140 -0.000108 -0.000111
(0.035) (0.005) (0.004) (0.326) (0.006) (0.004)
N 779253 779253 779253 779253 779253 779253
Note: Columns 1–3 present results for the first-differenced specification excluding cell fixed effects (γi), but including
region-by-month (δrm) and country-by-year (ρcy) fixed effects. Columns 4–6 display estimates for the baselines specification
including the full set of fixed effects, but using the first difference of SPEI (SPEIit − SPEIit−1) instead of the level.
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Table 7: Estimation results for different sample restrictions
NoD NoD NoD NoD NoD Inc Inc Inc Inc Inc
SPEI -0.000252 -0.000384 -0.000481 -0.000738 -0.00112 -0.0000908 -0.000126 -0.000162 -0.000242 -0.000434
(0.190) (0.108) (0.072) (0.057) (0.086) (0.027) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
N 978468 783285 590636 393052 197292 978468 783285 590636 393052 197292
Decile 5 6 7 8 9 5 6 7 8 9
Ons Ons Ons Ons Ons
SPEI -0.0000995 -0.000130 -0.000168 -0.000250 -0.000412
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
N 978468 783285 590636 393052 197292
Decile 5 6 7 8 9
Note: p-values in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the cell level. NoD: number of days with riots; Inc: binary indicator that equals one if at least one riot is
observed; Ons: binary indicator that equals one if at least on riot is observed in t, but none in t - 1; N: number of observations; Decile: population threshold (referring to the
country-level distribution) above which a cell is included in the sample. All specifications include cell (γi), region-by-month (δrm), and country-by-year (ρcy) fixed effects.
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Table 8: Estimation results for different types of standard errors
NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons NoD Inc Ons
SPEI -0.000436 -0.000122 -0.000127 -0.000436 -0.000122 -0.000127 -0.000436 -0.000122 -0.000127
(0.074) (0.034) (0.022) (0.094) (0.004) (0.001) (0.062) (0.010) (0.005)
N 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285 783285
Note: p-values in parenthesis. All specifications include cell (γi), region-by-month (δrm), and country-by-year (ρcy) fixed
effects. Columns 1–3 report specifications using standard errors that are robust to spatial and temporal dependence (Discroll
and Kraay, 1998). Columns 4–6 show results for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors
(Newey and West, 1994). Finally, Columns 7–9 display specifications based on standard errors that are robust to arbitrary
intra-group autocorrelation (Kiefer, 1980).
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